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Abstract
In this paper we explore the
usage of information communication
technologies (ICTs) in the
proliferation of non-state political
violence, and governmental
countermeasures to thwart such
actions. We are specifically interested
in gauging how communication
technologies are being adapted to
provide such non-state with new
terrorist repertoires. To explore this
issue, we utilize personal interviews
with members of the U.S. government
and members of Washington’s IT
security community.
Introduction
In 1993, when the World Trade
Center was bombed, there were 130
websites (Irving 1998; Surratt 2001;
Smithsonian 2003). 1 By September 2001,
there were well in excess of a billion,
with an estimated seven million pages
being uploaded daily (Castells 2001;
Introna and Nissenbaum, 2000). In 1993,
22 articles about the Internet appeared in
the New York Times (New York Times,

1994).2 In 2001, between October and
December alone, better than 760 Internet
stories were deemed “all the news that’s
fit to print” (New York Times, 2002). In
1993, some 13 million Americans had
cell phones, by 2001 there were 180
million subscribers (McFarland 2002;
Tesar 1983.) Today, American electoral
politics is online, with candidates for
county commissioner to the Presidency
advertising via glossy websites (Bonchek
1997; Davis 1999; Anderson and
Cornfield 2003; Levine 2003; Norris
2001; Rash 1997). Moreover, economics
has gone digital, with U.S. online retail
spending, e-commerce, worth forty-five
billion dollars in 2002, and high-tech
industries driving about one-quarter of all
economic growth.3 These figures reveal
an incredible technological and
behavioral phenomenon. Information
communication technologies (ICTs) are
therefore “the instruments with which
and the conditions within which we enact
some of the most profound conduct of
lives” (Fischer 1992, 7). By any measure,
computer-mediated communication
(CMC) and “new” ICTs are embedded
within the fabric of daily life — the way
we shop, do business, obtain information,
and communicate with others. These new
technological appliances, or more
precisely their usage, have changed
society.
Clearly, “[s]cience and
technology have made enormous
progress, but human nature, alas has not
changed” (Laqueur 1999, 4). Thus, while
ICTs are applied for positive goals, such
as maintaining social relationships across
2
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There were 130 websites in June 1993 (Surratt
2001; Irving 1998). There are no available
statistics for February 1993. By the end of 1993,
there were 623 websites (Irving 1998;
Smithsonian 2003).

In 1992, there were only two stories about the
Internet in the New York Times (See New York
Times Index, vol.80).
3
The figure of $45 billion does not include online
travel or other ticket sales, nor monies spent
through online brokerages (Regan 2003).

vast distances, they have a darker side,
where their adaptation has met the
sinister needs of our human nature, such
as crime,4 and as discussed in this paper,
terrorist violence by non-state political
actors. “The idea of terrorists
surreptiously hacking into a computer
system to introduce a virus, steal
sensitive information, deface or swamp a
web site, or turn off a crucial public
service seriously concerns security
personnel around the world” (Zanini and
Edwards 2001, 29; see also Arquilla and
Ronfeldt 2001).
Utilizing personal interviews of
members of the U.S. government and
Washington’s IT security community,
this paper examines the adoption and
adaptation of ICTs in the proliferation of
non-state political violence and the
governmental countermeasures to thwart
such actions. First, we specifically gauge
how communication technologies are
being adapted to provide non-state actors
with new terrorist repertoires (Tarrow
1998). Here, accepting Enders and
Sandler’s (2002) definition of terrorism,
we examine how ICT repertoires emerge
and spread, concluding that the usage of
“traditional” ICTs, technologies which
have achieved critical mass, dominate the
terrorist’s ICT toolbox and are utilized to
meet organizational needs (Morris and
Ogan 1996; Tarrow 1998; Arquilla and
Ronfeldt 2001). Second, recognizing that
terrorism does not occur in a vacuum, we
explore the counterterrorism measures
being employed by the U.S. government
to fight non-state political violence,
finding that new countermeasures by
4

For example, since 2003, credit card fraud and
identity theft, have been among America’s fastest
growing crimes. For example, 43% of fraud
cases filed with the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) were identity theft complaints, making it
the number one complaint in 2002 (Federal Trade
Commission, 2003).

governments are, in part, dependent on
the availability of new technologies.
Moreover, we find a commitment to a
macro-level approach to adopting passive
countermeasures, in order to combat the
organizational functions ICTs perform
for nonstate terrorists, while avoiding the
pitfalls of piecemeal policy efforts of the
past in the physical prevention of terrorist
entering the United States (see Enders
and Sanders 1993).
Terrorism
“Mr. President, we are under attack”
Andrew Card, Chief of Staff to President
George W. Bush, September 11th, 2001.
On September 11th, 2001, eight
times as many people died in the space of
an hour to transnational terrorism than
during an average year (see Enders and
Sanders 2002, 145). Today, transnational
terrorism –“when an incident is planned
in one country but executed in another”provides a threat to U.S. democracy and
our domestic tranquility, even though
historically such terrorism has only
directly affected relatively few people
(Laqueur 1999, 4). The atrocities of 9-11
shocked Americans and have engaged the
American government in the largest
national security initiative since World
War II.
Terrorism is not easy to define.
In this paper, however, we accept Ender’s
and Sandler’s (2002) definition of
terrorism. “Terrorism is the premeditated
use or threat of extra normal violence or
brutality by sub national groups to obtain
a political, religious, or ideological
objective through intimidation of a huge
audience, usually not directly with the
policy making that the terrorists seek to
influence” (2002 146). This definition
has broad applicability, and allows for

variations in the scope of repertoires and
organization of terrorist entities- state and
nonstate actors. In policymaking circles,
where all politics is local, definitions of
terrorism embody patriotism.

“Ah, I think the more you look at
terrorism, and try and understand the
problem of terrorism, the more you
realize, ah, its, politics, politics is always
going to play a role in the definition of
terrorism. …Senator Graham has
generally tried to take a more pragmatic
approach, umm, and just identify, is this
group that wants to harm Americans?
And ah, if it is, them, ah, we should treat
them as terrorists” (Dickas, 2004).

While these two definitions differ in
application and understanding, the two
are equally salient, illustrating academic
and policymaking realities.
There are three main precepts in
the identification and classification of a
terrorist act. A terrorist action has three
elements to it — target, devastation goal,
and tool (For examples of earlier
typologies see Drake 1998). Targets can
vary from civilian institutions (shopping
malls) and transportation (airplanes and
ocean liners), to military installations and
armaments (ships and aircraft) (Laqueur
1999; Stern 1999). The terrorist’s tool of
choice can vary too, from small
explosives to civilian airliners used as
flying bombs. Devastation goal refers to
the level and significance of damage,
whether physical or psychological, that a
terrorist group seeks in their actions
(Reich 1990; Crenshaw 2000). In this
paper we focus on the latter — the tool
— notably the usage of information
technology, and especially ICTs that have
achieved critical mass.

Historically, terrorism has been
used as the tool of separatists, zealots,
and patriots in an ultimate attempt to
spawn social change, political upheaval,
and revolution. Acts of violence by nonstate actors pre-dates thee 14th century; it
is not until the late 18th century that the
word “terrorism” is spawned. The trouble
with terrorism is not that it has always
been indefensible but that it has been
chosen more often than not as the prima
ratio of self-appointed saviors of freedom
and justice, of fanatics and madmen, not
as the ultimate ratio of rebels against real
tyranny (Laqueur 1999, 10).
The word terrorism originated in
1795, in connection with the French
revolutionaries who executed their
enemies and surpressed opposition with
the guillotine (Crenshaw 1990, 10). The
concept of terrorism took greater hold
during the 1870s in Russia, when
revolutionaries began to practise it. It was
a means for weaker or smaller forces,
without the financial means or military
strength of larger countries, to wage war,
essentially the only option for those
unable to fight an orthodox struggle.
Soon, the tactic spread to the
Macedonians and Armenians of the
Ottoman Empire, the Irish and the
Indians in the British Empire, and
separatists in America and Europe
(Enders and Sanders 1993). In the
twentieth century, terrorism would come
from both sides of the political spectrum,
first from the left and then in the mid
1970s and later, from the right, most
notably in Europe. Terrorism, a nuisance
to the many, has had a long history
(Laqueur 1999, 4-5). Biblical martyrs,
Roman dissidents, French
révolutionnaire’s, and English turncoats
all serve to establish the history of
terrorism. Thus, while we do not compare
the acts of Al Qaeda and the like to the

American founders, the principle and the
three elements remain comparable.
Terrorism has overthrown dictators,
toppled monarchs, and dispelled tyrants
throughout the ages, and will continue to
serve those who seek its ubiquitous
assistance.
Understanding terrorism generally
is impossible if the logic behind the
decision to commit acts of terror is
unapparent. Terrorists are rational actors
(Crenshaw 1990: 2000; Zanini and
Edwards, 2001). The actions of terrorists
serve as the avenues of communication,
and are generally motivated by a desire to
gain public attention and media coverage.
Most often than not terrorist actors feel
that all areas of communication and
compromise are exhausted. Terrorism is
seen, therefore, as the best, if not the
only, avenue open to them.
Terrorism may in fact follow
logical processes that can be discovered
and explained. For the purpose of
presenting this source of terrorist
behavior, rather than the psychological
one, it interprets the resort to violence as
a willful choice made by an organization
for political and strategic reasons, rather
than as the unintended outcome of
psychological or social factors (Crenshaw
2000, 7-8). It is important to recognize
the political psychology behind terrorist
actions since it enables one to fully
analyze terrorist action and determine
why the act was committed, by whom,
and what future action may be expected.
So what is the current state of
affairs? The War on Terror that began
when America was attacked, has
involved billions of dollars in America
alone, and defense spending is still on the
rise. The creation of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002
represented one of the largest
governmental restructuring in history.

With its broad executive power, and an
enormous annual budget, the DHS serves
as the supreme authority in domestic
protection. Post 9/11 the real question in
the back of the minds of Americans is
very simple; “Is America safer today than
it was on September 10, 2001?”
This, like defining terrorism, is
not easily answered. John Dickas (2004),
head of terrorism for former Senator Bob
Graham of Florida spoke to this;

Ah, [pause], No. Well, [pause] I think in
terms of, I don’t think the threat is
diminished, I think, we have improved
our security precautions in a lot of ways,
especially aviation security.

Speaking from a policymaking and
political standpoint, many see homeland
security as a multi dimensional, multifaceted operation, where large targets are
emphasized, and security is maintained in
the public domain. While certain
potential areas of terrorist penetration
have become much more secure;
aviation, immigration, and event security,
plenty of areas of weakness can be found.
If we are to learn anything from
the September 11 attacks it is that
terrorist groups use well planned and
unsuspecting means to launch their large
scale attacks. The necessity of media
coverage coupled with the media and
public’s tendency to become inured to a
certain level of death and destruction
motivates terrorist organizations to be
innovative and to collaborate with other
groups to learn and develop new ways to
kill and destroy. (Arquilla & Ronfeldt
1999; Bell 1984; Bassiouni 1982;
Edelman 1988; Crigler 1996; Katz and
Lazarsfeld 1955; Martin 1985; Podhoretz
1981; Zaller 1992). Areas of weakness as

well as recent technological
advancements have served to make the
terrorist threat much more complex and
harder to detect and defend. “In the near
future it will be technologically possible
to kill thousands, perhaps hundreds of
thousands, not to mention the toll the
panic that is likely to ensue may take”
(Laqueur 1999, 4). The availability of
weapons of mass destruction also has
policymakers and defense analysts
worried. If terrorists gain control of such
a device, the devastation would be
catastrophic. These new mediums and
tools pose a greater threat to society now
than in the past, largely because of the
new methods that terrorists now have
available. While science has allowed for
great advancements in technology,
human nature has not changed. Those
who wish to cause harm now have a new
frontier upon which to stage, conduct,
and execute their attacks, thus
challenging the world to a new type of
war.
Repertoires
Before analyzing the role of ICTs
in terrorism, we need to theoretically
situate our analytical approach. Research
on terrorist repertories has pointed at
terrorist motivations, resources, and
media attention as leading causes of
weapon choice (Morris and Hoe 1980 8086; Paletz el al.1982; Schaffert 1992). In
this paper, we also draw from the
literature of social movements, civil
conflict and war; notably, Tarrow’s
(1994) work on political opportunity
structures. In Power of Movements (1994,
19), Tarrow points out that political
action by groups does not just pop out of
the heads of organizers but is part of what
he calls a “repertoire of contention”
which forms a tool kit that a group can

draw from to try and get its message
across. Thus, we ask, what ICTs do nonstate terrorist actors have within their
respective toolkits? And, how do they use
them?
ICTs and Terrorism
Information communication
technologies (ICTs), or our use of them,
as stated, have changed the way we live
our lives, and their darker side, is
“altering the nature of conflict across the
spectrum” (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001,
1). The adoption of new ICTs, notably
Internet appliances (chat rooms, bulletin
boards, and email) and cell phones, by
nonstate terrorists is organizationally
advantageous (Gehrett 2004). With
geographically dispersed constituents,
who increasingly are carrying out
distinct, yet corresponding activities, biand multidirectional ICTs are able to
facilitate the quick dissemination of
information across a decentralized
terrorist network (Arquilla and Ronfeldt
2001,1: see also Enders and Sanders
2002). Such ICTs are new additional
tools within a terrorist group’s repertoire
that are being utilized to meet the
organizational needs of decentralized
networks. In addition, it is important to
note that, information-age technology can
help terrorists conduct three broad types
of offensive information operations (IO).
First, it can aid them in their perception
management and propaganda activities.
Next, such technology can be used to
attack virtual targets for disruptive
purposes. Finally, IT can be used to cause
physical destruction (Zanini and Edwards
2001, 41). From our interviews, however,
we find the greatest concern among
Washington insiders’ centers around the
organizational functions everyday ICTs,
such as the Internet, are providing

terrorists. Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s (2001,
1) concept of “netwar,” even in our post
9-11 world, is pertinent. It is this subject
therefore, that dominates our discussion.
Succinctly, the importance of
ICTs today to nonstate terrorists is first
and foremost their ability to facilitate
organization, the central tenet of Arquilla
and Ronfeldt’s (2001) concept of netwar.
Netwar is a result of the rise of network
forms of organization, which in turn is
partly a result of the computerized
information revolution. To realize its
potential, a fully interconnected network
requires a capacity for constant, dense
information and communication flows,
more so than do other forms of
organization (e.g., hierarchies). This
capacity is afforded by the latest
information and communication
technologies- cellular telephones, fax
machines, electronic mail (email), web
sites, and computer conferencing
(Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001, 10).
Terrorists are adopting and using
ICTs for more than the dissemination of
spoken or written information though. A
significant component of the
organizational dynamic within netwar is
financial (Dickas 2004; Platt 2004).
Many of binary ones and zeros that have
interested US intelligence since 9-11
have centered on electronic funds
transfers within bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda
network (Dickas 2004; Gehrett 2004;
Hutchinson 2004).
So what makes a nonstate terrorist
select an ICT? There are a number of
reasons, but the selection process is, in
part, based on a particular ICTs cost
effectiveness. The introduction of new
technologies in an organization follows a
complex and often lengthy process. Not
only do innovative systems have to be
developed or acquired, but organizational
actors have to become familiar with new

systems and be able to use them
effectively. Given the challenge, terrorist
groups are likely to channel their scarce
organizational resources to acquire those
IT skills that have the greatest leverage
for the least amount of cost and effort
(Zanini and Edwards 2001, 50).
It is not surprising, therefore, that
terrorists are using readily available
technologies that are entrenched within
the fabric of industrial societies. The
embeddedness of the technologies used
makes communications, as will be
discussed later with regard to
counterterrorism, via them difficult to
control, although not impossible to
intercept.
Thus, we argue it is useful to see
the usage of ICTs by terrorist nonstate
actors, as social constructivism, rather
than technological determinism. The
terrorist organization is “neither impacted
by an external force, nor are they the
unconscious pawns of cultural Geist.
Instead of being manipulated, [it]
manipulates (Fischer 1992, 17).
Technologies are not repressively foisted
upon passive populations, any more than
the power to realize their repressive
potential is in the hands of a conspiring
few. They are developed at any one time
and place in accord with a complex set of
existing rules or rational procedures,
institutional histories, technical
possibilities, and last, but not least,
popular desires (Penley and Ross, 1991).
Equally essential, different ICTs
will be applied for separate goals. As
Claude Fischer (1992, 7) notes,
“separable parts of a technological
system may have separable
consequences.” Thus, a terrorist may use
the Internet’s separable parts, such as
email and chat-rooms, differently to
achieve different goals. As Zanini and
Edwards note, Bin-Laden’s “operatives

have used CD-ROM disks to store and
disseminate information on recruiting,
bomb-making,” and “Hamas activists in
the United States use chat rooms to plan
operations” (Zanini and Edwards 2001,
37). In short, different ICTs have
different uses.
Nonstate actors adopt pre-existing
technologies. They are not involved in
technological innovation, rather mere
technological adaptation. The ICTs used
by terrorists are not the latest
groundbreaking advances in technology,
but rather commercial technologies
which have already been broadly adopted
in Western societies. Moreover, in
communication theory terms, the ICTs of
choice for nonstate terrorists have
achieved critical mass, which is “when
about 10-20 percent of the population has
adopted a news innovation, the
innovation can be spread to the rest of the
social system” (Morris & Ogan 1996:
45). Recognition of the theory of critical
mass helps explain further the cost
effectiveness component of ICTs choice
by terrorists.
Not only are the ICTs adopted
established technologies in industrial
states, but these new tools are not
replacing older, or non-technological,
tools within a terrorists repertoire of
contention. Rather, what we conclude is
while ICTs are facilitators of the day-today organizational networking of a
group, “electronically mediated
coordination will not be able to entirely
supplant face-to-face exchanges”
between network members. The
supposed anonymity ICTs, such as chatrooms and bulletin boards provide, does
not allow for trust to be built between
constituent members. Human face-to-face
interaction, as the civil society and social
networks literature indicates, is important
to foster trust (Harwood and McIntosh

2004; Kraut et al. 1998; Kraut et al.
2001). “Human couriers and face-to face
meetings may still remain essential” for
terrorists (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001,
339).
The combining of old and new is
also a product of “communication over
electronic channels can become a
liability, since it leaves digital traces”
(Zanini and Edwards 2001, 39).
Mistrust, therefore, also centers on the
level of anonymity new ICTs, such as the
Internet and cellular phones provide.
This mistrust is justified since
“Carnivore’s ability to track Osama bin
Laden’s email was critical in thwarting
several of his strikes” (Zanini and
Edwards 2001, 39). Thus, the adoption of
technologies by nonstate terrorist actors
is a complex decision. They are not just
adopted and adapted because the
technology is there. “There is no built-in
demand to innovate” for terrorists.
Netwar, therefore, as Arquilla and
Ronfeldt (2001, 339) state, “can be
waged without necessarily having access
to the Internet and other advanced
technologies. This level may mix old and
new, low-and high-tech capabilities.”
New technologies, therefore, are not
necessarily replacing old methods or
tools within terrorists’ toolbox (Tarrow
1998).
The question for today and
tomorrow is whether terrorists have the
desire and opportunity to significantly
increase their reliance on IT, not for
organizational means, but to achieve
disruptive and destructive IO? Is the
usage of cell-phones as detonation
devices, as occurred in Madrid last year,
only the beginning? While a concern
voiced by several academics, notably
Arquilla and Ronfeldt, from our
interviews, we find little concern for the
emergence of newer, more

technologically savvy groups (Gehrett
2004; Hutchinson 2004; Platt 2004).
Instead, we find counterterrorism efforts
focusing on overcoming the
organizational usage of ICTs, as well as,
the physical prevention of terrorists into
the United States.
Countermeasures against Terrorism
Terrorism does not occur in a
vacuum. Counterterrorism efforts to
detect, prevent, and/or mitigate damage,
destruction, or death from a particular
terrorist repertoire, operate
simultaneously with terrorism. In the post
9-11 world, the nonstate terrorist is a
multi-organizational decentralized
network that presents structural problems
for industrial intelligence organizations to
overcome. Government bureaucracies are
hierarchical structures that closely guard
their policy turf. Such structures do not
serve contemporary counterterrorism
efforts well. As Arquilla and Ronfeldt
(2001, 15) note, “[i]t takes networks to
fight networks.” Decentralized
bureaucracies, such as the idea behind the
Department of Homeland Security are
necessary to more effectively morph
terrorist group structures.5 Destroying
terrorist organizations’ organizational
structure is key to preventing offensive
attacks, and for keeping America safe.
Policymaking cannot, therefore, be
piecemeal since in the past, such efforts
were ineffective (Enders and Sanders
1993). In short, counterterrorism must be
all encompassing, incorporating both
active and passive policies, and have
5

The idea is only the first step. Implementation
is key. We find certain dissatisfaction from
democrats, for example, Senator Nelson of
Florida, on the implementation. “Ah, he
supported the idea, but has been disappointed by
the implementation” of the Department of
Homeland Security (Platt 2004).

micro- and macro-level strategies, while
remaining protective of the civil rights of
citizens (Hutchinson 2004). This is not an
easy task.
At the macro-level, the question
is, how should authorities stop attacks
using national-level efforts to thwart
entry of “bad actors” and weaponry?
Enders & Sandler (1993) and Landes
(1978) concentrate primarily (but not
solely) on broad-based countermeasures
that target no particular repertoire. The
Department of Homeland Security’s
strategic plan (U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, 2004, 14) in
Objectives 2 and 3, speaks to this by
focusing primarily on efforts to
“interdict…unlawful migration of people,
cargo, drugs, and other contraband,”
protect infrastructure from generic forms
of attack, and assure broad-based sharing
of knowledge. These examples of macromanagement serve to provide the
overarching infrastructure of
counterterrorism.
At the micro level,
countermeasures target a specific terrorist
repertoire, seeking to develop combatant
strategies that are both effective and
feasible. Examples of micro level
management can be seen with the
reaction of the United States against the
terror attacks of September 11. The usage
of hijacked airplanes to propagate
terrorism was not a new phenomenon, it
was how Al Qaeda operatives gained
control, and further used the airplanes,
which was the new repertoire. The United
States responded simultaneously on the
micro and macro level policies. On the
macro level, as stated above, was the
creation on the Department of Homeland
Security and the establishment of the
Transportation Security Agency. On the
micro level, America witnessed the
installation of advanced screening

equipment and personnel at all airports,
the commissioning of air marshals, and
the prohibition of carry on items any of
which could pose a possible risk. Along
with such passive policies we also
witnessed active policies, most notably
“taking out a lot of terrorist training
camps in Afghanistan” (Platt 2004). It is
important, therefore, to recognize both
levels of strategy have a job to do,
counteracting individual repertoires on
the micro level and instituting
appropriate policy on the macro level.
Technology undeniably has a role
to play in counterterrorism. The
technology is non-traditional, i.e., the
latest advancements in IT. These devices,
both active and passive, offer
unprecedented new capabilities that will,
it is hoped, save lives and keep
Americans at home and abroad safer.
The commitment and role of
technological advances in the War on
Terror is evident from the allocations for
defense spending on R&D in 2005. This
year such spending will increase by 6.8
percent or $4.8 billion to another all-time
high.
From interviews with members of
the U.S. government and IT security
community, the following are
implemented or forthcoming
governmentally initiated programs that
are utilizing information technologies to
safeguard America.
First, is nanotechnology. While
politicians, with the exception of Asa
Hutchinson, did not speak to this, Ann
Gehrett of CACI was particularly
enthusiastic about the potential
nanotechnology heralds for
counterterrorism. Nanotechnology is still
in the very early stages of its R&D, but
the basis of nanotechnology revolves
around the application of science in the
development of new materials and

processes through the manipulation of
molecular and atomic particles.
Second, there was much
discussion among both politicians and IT
security specialists about biometrics.
Biometric technologies automatically
authenticate, identify, or verify an
individual based on physiological or
behavioral characteristics. This process is
accomplished by using computer
technology in a non-invasive way to
match patterns of live individuals in real
time against enrolled records. Examples
include products that recognize faces,
hands, fingers, signatures, irises, voices,
and fingerprints. Biometrics is currently
being used to enhance computer network
security, protect financial transactions,
regulate immigration, and monitor border
flow (Dornbush 2005). Currently the
Department of Homeland Security is
using biometrics in conjunction with
terrorist watch lists and databases in the
US-VISIT system. The US-VISIT system
links databases to provide valuable
information to port of entry officials and
consular officials overseas and creates a
database of pictures and finger scans of
everyone entering the United States with
a non-immigrant visa (and soon to
include visa waiver travelers). This new
tool means that we have a much better
idea of who is entering our country. If an
individual’s finger scan registers a match
on the terrorist watch list, the Department
is able to stop them from entering the
country at the border. Over 200 people
have already been turned away from our
borders using this new system (DHS Fact
Sheet, 2004). The benefits of biometrics
are not only its ability to be a stand-alone
safeguard, but it is also well suited to
work in conjunction with other
technologies to create a multi-layered
security infrastructure.

Third, there was some discussion,
notably by Asa Hutchinson, UnderSecretary of Homeland Security, and Ann
Gehrett of CACI, about BioWatch, which
is a series of environmental monitors
located in various cities throughout the
U.S. These monitors provide an early
warning of a potential chemical or
biological attack, allowing for immediate
countermeasures and treatment. The
Department of Homeland Security is also
deploying and evaluating mobile
automatic air testing kits that house
biological and chemical sensors allowing
for instantaneous detection anywhere. As
well as BioWatch, they discussed
BioShield which is an aggressive
campaign that seeks to develop and
maintain medical vaccines and supplies
that would be deployed and administered
in the event of an attack (DHS Fact
Sheet, 2004). BioWatch coupled with
Bioshield, they suggested comprising
safeguard that serves to keep America’s
cities and their citizens’ safe before,
during, and after an attack.
Fourth and while not involving
advanced technologies on the scale of
nanotechnology, but equally important to
a macro/micro-level strategy, is the
integration of federal and state computer
databases. Just as hierarchical
bureaucracies provide a pitfall for
fighting non-state terrorism, so too does
federalism. Timely and accurate
exchange of information between the
federal, state, and local governments is
crucial in the prevention, detection, and
arrest of terrorists and terrorist activities.
Post September 11, the information
sharing abilities of U.S. law enforcement
and intelligence remained poor; “we have
a lot of problems with information
sharing, ah, works being done that’s
redundant, or ah, or works being pursued
on parallel tracks with no

communications, we have a lot of
problems of that nature” (Dickas, 2004).
It is particularly poor at the local level,
with both of Florida’s Senators
spokespersons noting there is a “need for
more information-sharing” particularly in
the dissemination of “timely information”
to local agencies (Dickas 2004: Platt
2004). “I know the higher up you get, the
better it gets, but it never gets very good”
(Platt 2004).
While Senator Gramm’s
spokesperson suggests more needs to be
done, several policies are in the field. The
recent creation of The Homeland Security
Information Network, which is available
in all 50 states, makes threat-related
information available to law enforcement
and emergency managers on a daily basis
through a web-based system (Hutchinson
2004). In addition, members of 35
different Federal agencies are now all colocated together in the DHS’s new 24hour Homeland Security Operations
Center, which allows the information
coming from various sources to be
synthesized together and then shared with
other federal partners such as the FBI and
the Department of Defense. Furthermore,
nearly 100 bulletins and other threat
related dossiers have been sent to
homeland security professionals across
the country (DHS Fact Sheet, 2004).
While no one we interviewed
spoke to this, it is also important to note
that integration cross nationally must
occur also. “There is,” as Enders and
Sanders (2002) note, “an irony, because
collective action among terrorist groups
in sharing training and financing has been
quite substantial. To date, this suggests
that terrorists are more united in their
common goals than are countries in
addressing the transnational terrorist
threat.” The lack of discussion of this
issue may be, in part, a product of the

national-centric definition of terrorism
used by policymakers (Dickas 2004);
however, if a macro-level strategy is to
be effective, a global component must
feature, particularly in passive policies of
data and information-sharing.
Lastly, several interviewees
spoke of Operation Liberty Shield. This
program truly embodies protecting the
homeland as in conjunction with the
federal government, many private sector
companies work to ensure American
remains safe. Although the two share a
common goal, the private sector often
takes a different approach to homeland
security. CACI is one example of a
private corporation whose primary
objective is working with the federal
government to ensure homeland security.
Operation Liberty Shield is a program
that displays this collective action.
Operation Liberty Shield is a
“comprehensive national plan designed to
increase protections for America’s
citizens and infrastructure while
maintaining the free flow of goods and
people across our border with minimal
disruption to our economy and way of
life” (CACI, 2005). Operation Liberty
Shield incorporates various different
governmental agencies, and is critical in
the protection of American domestic
security and surveillance. Anne Gehrett,
CACI’s vice-president for law
enforcement programs, particularly
emphasized throughout the interview the
importance of this multi-agency
cooperation, primarily through the
dissemination of information, and the
intensive usage of terrorist watch lists
and databases (Gehrett, 2004).
All of these countermeasures, to
varying degrees involve ICTs, and
together formulate core components in
America’s fight against terrorism. While
these technologies and programs serve to

keep Americans safer, they are but just
the initial phase (Hutchinson 2004).
Much still needs to be done. Great
emphasis has been placed on the
homeland since 9/11, however what
about American interests abroad? It is
overseas after all, that Americans are
most are risk (Enders and Sanders 2002,
162). The sharing of information amongst
governments, as we suggest, while a step
in the right direction, is currently flawed
since no formal anti-terrorism campaign
has been established on an international
scale, thus information sharing between
international agencies and state actors is
piecemeal, which will prove ineffective.
Today, terrorism is limitless in its
geographical scope. It fails to adhere to
recognizable borders, and discerns no
international set of laws. The two types
of analysis serve to combat terrorism in
two very different ways, and their
application can mean the difference in the
success or failure of the terrorist act.
Speaking in terms of macro application
little can be done legislatively to protect
the individual. Many of the millions
spent on macro applications of legislature
only result in the diminishing of personal
freedoms, a sort of societal nuisances.
Micro level application targets individual
repertoires of the terrorist threat, thereby
targeting terrorism with a personalized
strategy. While it is easy to say what
would work in theory, it must remain
salient that terrorism will always remain
a threat to those it seeks to target. In the
end, the most effective weapon against
the terrorist threat remains as basic today
as it will a decade from now; keen
awareness of any possible threat,
preparation for any attack, and
responding immediately to any
emergency.

Conclusion
In conclusion, we find two very
different ICT stories being told. First,
there is the story of non-state terrorists.
This is a tale in which traditional ICTs,
mediums that have achieved critical
mass, are being used to further, and
maintain, a group’s decentralized, multiorganizational, network. Here, ICTs play
a supporting role, since netwar, at its
core, is about organization (Arquilla and
Ronfeldt 2001). The usage of traditional
ICTs by non-state terrorist actors is to
facilitate information-sharing and
knowledge. Furthermore, we find
traditional ICTs are clearly additional
tools within the terrorist’s toolbox. The
adoption of new ICTs, therefore, does not
replace, by rather supplement, preexisting tools, notably face-to-face
meetings and human couriers. Lastly, we
find the concerns expressed in several
academic works of the potential for new
high-tech terrorists groups (Laqueur
1999; Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001) is not
voiced by our interviewees whose
concerns rather center on the
organizational role ICTs play in terrorism
today. This disparity of concern among
academics and practitioners we hope to
explore in future research.
Turning to counterterrorism, a
very different story is told. Here, the
latest technological advancements are
being utilized to combat terrorism.
Biometrics, as Asa Hutchinson (2004)
noted for example, has allowed for
unprecedented steps to be taken in the
protection of key areas of infrastructure,
thereby limiting potential terrorist targets.
In addition, the integration of databases
and watch lists is furthering information
sharing efforts throughout the federal
system. From our interviews, it is evident
that effective counterterrorism will

continue to incorporate active and passive
policies at both the micro and macro
levels.
While technology will continue to
advance, human nature will remain
unchanged. Terrorism has always been
apart of American history; it didn’t begin
on September 11, 2001. Combating
terrorism today is an incredibly salient
policy issue, with billions spent already,
and billions more still to come. As John
Dickas acknowledges, the “threat is
diminished,” however, much remains to
be done to ensure a secure America from
terrorism by nonstate political actors.
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